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Technology transfer in the interwar U.S. Pharmaceuticals sector: the case of 
E. Merck of Darmstadt and Merck & Co., Rahway NJ. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This is a case study of the U.S. pharmaceuticals producer, Merck & Co. By 1940 this was 
one of the leading pharmaceutical producers in the United States, and went on to 
become one of the global industry leaders after the second world war. It was founded in 
1891 as the U.S. subsidiary of a much larger German pharmaceuticals company, E. 
Merck of Darmstadt. The existing understanding of Merck & Co’s history emphasises 
how it was reacquired by the American branch of the Merck family after wartime 
sequestration, and that from then onwards it pursued a path of development separate 
from its former parent. This article revisits that history of the company and shows how 
the two Merck’s began to co operate and share technology and manufacturing know-
how during the 1930s, something which was particularly to the advantage of Merck & 
Co. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The recognition in the United States during World War One of its dependence on 
German manufactured dyestuffs and advanced pharmaceuticals shocked public opinion. 
The dominance of key markets by enemy producers prompted important policy 
changes. The sequestration of all German-owned U.S. assets by the Alien Property 
Custodian followed U.S. entry into the war in 1917. German pharmaceutical factories 
and patents were sold on to U.S. interests with the explicit aim of stimulating domestic 
production. Prohibitive tariffs on imported chemicals and pharmaceuticals were 
introduced after the war, stopping any resumption of the import trade in its tracks and 
so reducing competitive pressures on the emerging U.S. pharmaceuticals sector.1  
 
The indigenous American pharmaceutical industry was dominated by ‘patent-medicine’ 
producers, specialist producers of vigorously promoted herbal elixirs and tinctures of 
doubtful efficacy. The impact on the American pharmaceuticals industry of these policy 
changes was seemingly profound. German manufactured medicines were no longer 
competitive in the U.S. market. After a generation of German producers building ‘patent 
thickets’ in the U.S. market as a competitive barrier, suddenly U.S. pharmaceuticals 
producers could gain access to German intellectual property.2  There were, however, 
only a few American ethical pharmaceuticals manufacturers which had sufficient 
manufacturing capabilities to be able to utilise German technologies. Abbott 
successfully acquired the valuable Bayer patent for synthesising salicylic acid, the basis 
of producing aspirin, for example, and subsequently developed a science-focused 
business in the 1920s and 1930s.3 But most American producers struggled to adapt. U.S. 
pharmaceuticals output increased by only just over one third from 1922 to 1928, nearly 
half of this in salicylic acid production alone. Given that the dominant suppliers to the 
U.S. market had been forcibly removed by government decree on entry into the war, this 
does not seem a particularly fast rate of growth.4  
 
 2 
Just over a decade later, however, by the time of the U.S. entry into World War Two, the 
biggest American pharmaceutical companies - Abbott, Lilly, Merck, Parke, Davis and 
Pfizer – had all acquired sufficient technological capabilities that they were able to make 
major contributions to the war effort, through the crash penicillin program, plasma 
production, sulfas and other important therapies. They were therefore well positioned 
to benefit after the war and enjoyed around half the global market in the early 1950s.5 
While the forced removal of German competition created the opportunity for the 
indigenous U.S. industry to develop in the 1920s, it was in fact in the 1930s that a 
dramatic transformation in the technological and manufacturing capabilities of the U.S. 
pharmaceuticals industry occurred.6 
 
The consensus among historians of the American pharmaceutical industry is that this 
transition occurred because of a combination of a much greater commitment to internal 
research among American firms and the growth of increasingly strong collaborative 
networks between the leading university chemists and private companies.7 The 
fragmentary data that exist for individual firms also suggests that research intensity 
among the leading firms increased during the 1930s. 
 
Abbott spent around $100,000 annually on research in the early to mid-1930s (and had 
a research staff of 29 by 1933), probably representing a research intensity of around 
2½ percent of sales during the mid 1930s.8 Lilly’s expenditure on R&D was claimed to 
be between two and three percent of sales in 1930.9 Merck & Co’s research intensity 
grew from only 0.3 percent of sales in 1929 and 0.5 percent in 1930, to 1.4 percent in 
1931, and 1.5 percent in 1932, 2.0 percent in 1933, 2.3 percent in 1934, 2.4 percent in 
1935, 2.8 percent in 1936, 3.2 percent in 1938, 3.3 percent in 1939, and then to 3.9 
percent in 1940.10 There are less data for other firms. What do exist seem to indicate 
that research intensity was lower elsewhere.11  
 
Table 1 shows that the leading American ethical pharmaceutical companies also saw a 
substantial increase in patenting activities in the 1930s. Before World War One 
American pharmaceutical companies had conducted very little patenting. But the Table 
indicates that by 1932 Abbott and Lilly were making some efforts to patent 
pharmaceutical innovations. Until 1936 Abbott and Lilly were behaving somewhat 
differently to Merck and Parke, Davis. But from 1938 Merck began to patent at a level 
which exceeded all the others. The evidence of increasing research expenditures and 
patenting levels among these leading American pharmaceutical companies appear to 
support the view that these firms experienced a transition during the 1930s and 
became research-focused organisations, developing internal research capabilities and 
strong links to leading scientists at U.S. universities. 
 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
 
This article is a case study of Merck & Co, a firm clearly identified by both 
contemporaries and subsequently by historians as one of the industry leaders during 
the 1930s.12 As the research expenditure and patenting data suggest, by 1940 Merck & 
Co was seemingly the most research intensive American pharmaceutical producer. This 
article aims to show that Merck & Co’s rise to industry leadership followed a somewhat 
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different path to its peers in the 1930s, depending on a largely concealed transfer of 
technology and know-how during the 1930s from its former German parent, E. Merck of 
Darmstadt. This aspect of Merck & Co’s history has been omitted from the official 
corporate histories and largely ignored by academic studies. Transfers of German 
technology and know-how to American firms were not unknown during the interwar 
period. Steen describes several such relationships among synthetic dyestuffs producers, 
for instance.13 Within the smaller pharmaceuticals niche, Bayer had formed the 
Winthrop Group with Sterling in order to reacquire its U.S. patents and markets in the 
early1920s, and Schering re-established its U.S. subsidiary in 1933.14 But, this article 
contends that these were relatively insignificant. Neither of the U.S. operations of 
Winthrop/Sterling or Schering acquired sufficient prominence in research to be 
included in the U.S. war effort, for example, in contrast to Merck & Co.15  
 
The article makes three contributions to the business history literature on the 
development of the U.S. pharmaceuticals industry in the 1930s.  First, it offers a 
substantially more detailed account of the extensive scientific and commercial 
interrelationships of the two Mercks between 1919 and 1940 than is currently 
available. Second, the article shows that E. Merck’s research and scientific capabilities 
remained significantly ahead of Merck & Co, until at least 1938. Third, the case of Merck 
& Co shows that where this leading U.S. pharmaceutical producer did gain a clear 
advantage over its former German parent in the late 1930s was in pharmaceutical 
manufacturing. Given Merck & Co’s prominence in the industry in the late 1930s and 
1940s, we speculate that this may suggest that advances in understanding process 
technologies may have been a more significant source of the U.S. industry’s remarkable 
success in producing new medicines during World War Two than is currently 
recognised.16  
 
The article is organised as follows. The next section describes the two Mercks’ relative 
positions in 1914, the date from which the U.S. subsidiary effectively became an 
autonomous unit. The impact of the U.S. entry into the war in 1917 on Merck & Co and 
its forced separation from Darmstadt is then outlined. Without access to its former 
parent’s products, Merck & Co. struggled in the 1920s, precipitating a merger with 
another former German-U.S. fine chemical producer, Powers Waters Rosengarten in 
1927. The existing business history literature on Merck & Co emphasizes the complete 
separation of the two Mercks by this point. But here we show how, in fact, this merger 
became the catalyst for the intensification of the commercial relationship between the 
two Mercks, leading to the signing of a treaty in 1932 that promulgated a very 
substantial transfer of product and process technologies from Germany to the U.S. in the 
1930s. The implications of this case study are discussed in the concluding section. 
 
 
 
E. MERCK OF DARMSTADT AND THE GROWTH OF MERCK AND CO TO 1914 
 
While the large German dyestuffs producers (BASF, Bayer and Hoechst) had already 
successfully diversified into pharmaceuticals production, by 1914 the venerable E. 
Merck of Darmstadt was Germany’s largest producer of pharmaceuticals.17 Merck & Co 
was the outcome of E. Merck’s decision in 1891 to upgrade its New York agency into a 
wholly-owned distributor. E. Merck was founded by Emmanuel Merck (1794-1855) as a 
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manufacturer and distributor of fine chemicals to pharmacists. Emmanuel’s sons - Carl, 
Georg and Wilhelm – expanded it. Wilhelm was a trained scientist. His elder son, Carl 
Emmanuel, followed in the family’s scientific tradition, becoming steeped in the 
chemistry of alkaloids. George F. Merck was Wilhelm’s second son, and was trained in 
commerce, with a brief to expand the firm’s overseas’ business.18 Wilhelm posted 
George to London and Paris to learn about the leading foreign markets, before he 
arrived in New York in 1891 to oversee the newly created subsidiary.19 
 
Merck & Co quickly became an important supplier of E. Merck’s products to the U.S. 
market. It grew quickly, employing 180 people by 1896, somewhat smaller than the 
leading U.S. wholesaler, SmithKline, which employed 265 in 1895.20 In 1902 
SmithKline’s sales reached $3m and it marketed 15,000 different product lines.21 Merck 
& Co’s 1902 sales were just over $1.5m. By 1914 it marketed 3,500 to 4,000 items in the 
U.S. But these represented only a third of the total number of products E. Merck had 
available in Germany. The U.S. subsidiary was relocated to Rahway, NJ, where it shortly 
began to manufacture around 1,000 of the more basic items by 1914, by which point its 
sales exceeded $3m. Merck & Co had grown to attain some significance since 1891 but it 
remained ‘organizationally, technically and financially… tightly linked to the German 
parent’.22   
 
German success is typically explained by a combination of the creation of a specific 
model for industrial research, pursued at a scale hitherto unknown.23 Large German 
pharmaceuticals firms were typically ten times bigger than their U.S. peers, and so able 
to finance far more ambitious and so successful research programmes.24 In 1890 E. 
Merck’s key products were processed alkaloids (cocaine, morphine, etc), some semi-
synthesized galenicals (such as salycilic acid) and an enormous range of reagents, 
intermediate products and industrial chemicals.25 It pursued an ambitious research 
programme, depending on its collaborations with several of Germany’s leading 
scientists in its universities and, from 1911 onwards, the newly formed Kaiser Wilhelm 
Institutes.26 E. Merck’s increasing research intensity saw its research expenditure rise 
from just under 2.5 percent of sales between 1902 to 1905 to perhaps over 3 percent of 
sales by 1912.27 Burhop’s analysis of E. Merck’s profitability shows that by 1913 and 
1918 the company was dependent on ten products for the overwhelming majority of its 
pharmaceuticals sales and profits, all of which were invented between 1890 and 1905 
(the leading six sellers in 1918 were all invented in just eight years from 1895 to 
1903).28 These blockbusters powered its global growth in the years before 1914, 
including in the United States.29 Veronal, for example, (invented in 1903) became the 
leading barbiturate sedative in the United States.30  
 
From late 1914 the British blockade on raw drug imports prompted German producers 
to innovate, with new products emerging to replace now unobtainable raw drugs. 31  
The absence of raw drugs in Germany also influenced pharmacists’ practice, as it 
‘accelerated the pace at which pharmaceutical specialties were replacing raw materials’, 
which therefore gave the leading research-intensive producers more incentive to 
develop their own brands.32  
 
E. Merck augmented its position as one of the leading German firms in the interwar 
period, moving into packaging its medicines in tablet form. E. Merck employee numbers 
increased to 3,600 by 1923 before stabilizing at around 3,000 between 1924 and 1932, 
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then increasing to 4,100 by 1938.33 The company increased its investment in in-house 
research, establishing a central laboratory in 1927, and was successful in developing 
new products.34 It led to major innovations in plant-protection agents, synthetic 
vitamins A, C and D, hormone products, as well as further developments in sedatives 
and anesthetics.35 By 1939 E. Merck together with other leading producers had 
increased Germany’s share of world exports in pharmaceuticals from 30 percent (in 
1913) to 43 percent.36  
 
The German parent was therefore very much the dominant partner in the early years of 
Merck & Co’s existence. It was a straightforward parent-subsidiary relationship, like 
many German immigrant businesses in the U.S. before 1917. The Darmstadt company 
was much bigger than the Rahway subsidiary (see Table 2) and remained so through 
until 1940. Despite the losses from World War One, E. Merck continued as one of the 
world’s leading, research-intensive pharmaceutical producers throughout the interwar 
period.  
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
 
MERCK & CO.: WORLD WAR ONE SEQUESTRATION AND CONDITIONAL 
REACQUISITION 
 
The U.S. Government’s Alien Property Custodian (APC) sequestrated all German-owned 
U.S. assets on entering World War One in 1917, including, in April 1918, E. Merck’s 80 
percent shareholding in Merck & Co. Despite being a U.S. citizen, George F. Merck was 
also compelled to turn over two thirds of his personal 20 percent stake in Merck & Co to 
the APC in return for the concession that he could continue as its President.37 The Alien 
Property Custodian then sold off as many of these sequestered asset as possible to 
American companies and American citizens.38 Despite being a U.S. citizen and long-time 
resident, given his German background and continued family links to the original 
German parent, George F. Merck was viewed with suspicion.39 So when George F 
emerged victorious at the auction in May 1919 and reacquired control of the company, 
there was some considerable official consternation with the German connection.40  W.H. 
Moran, Chief of the Secret Service, commissioned a report to investigate the sale. But the 
strongest words came from Francis P. Garvan (the Alien Property Custodian) writing to 
the Advisory Sales Committee of the Aliens Property Custodian, expressing strong 
reservations at the outcome.  
 
Garvan’s priority was to safeguard ‘the importance to the American people of the clean, 
unGermanized manufacture and sale of drugs’. But George F. Merck had now reacquired 
control of Merck & Co., where ‘the temptation which must exist to those of former 
German inclination [i.e. George F. Merck] to take advantage of the increased return from 
a combination with E. Merck’ would be so overwhelming, because the ‘financial 
advantage [to Merck & Co] of a re-alliance with E. Merck of Darmstadt would be 
tremendous’. Furthermore, George F. Merck could not be trusted to keep to any promise 
to refrain from any connection with Darmstadt, because ‘his [George F. Merck’s] 
business practices are of the usual secretive German practices’. This conundrum meant 
that the ‘close connection between Merck & Co and E. Merck of Darmstadt, requires 
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unusual supervision and watchfulness against the renewal of this affiliation after the 
bars are let down for the resumption of trade between this country and Germany’.41 
 
The result was that as a condition of the sale, George F. Merck was forced to agree to a 
Trust that oversaw his management of Merck & Co for ten years from July 23rd, 1919. 
The Trust’s ‘purpose [is]… to insure the continuous Americanization of the business of 
Merck & Co, both in operation and control… to ensure during the term of the Trust no 
stock be sold to German citizens, German corporations or corporations mainly 
controlled by German citizens…. The close connection between Merck & Co and E. 
Merck of Darmstadt, requires unusual supervision and watchfulness against a renewal 
of this affiliation’. And while the Trust provided for early termination under limited 
circumstances, this was conditional on ‘such termination will not thwart such purposes’. 
Direction of the firm remained with George F. Merck. But crucially the trustees were 
empowered ‘to ensure the continuous Americanization of the business…’42 Merck & Co 
was therefore forced from July 1919 to sever all ties with Darmstadt.  
 
In the official corporate history of Merck & Co, Galambos and Sturchio present this 
transfer of ownership as the fundamental break with Darmstadt.43 This view was 
reinforced with a more detailed discussion of the transfer of ownership and subsequent 
developments to 1925 in a 1994 publication.44 Here the authors emphasized that while 
the legal break up and the formation of the Trust in 1919 led to a complete and 
irrevocable separation, there remained some ongoing business ties in the early 1920s. 
As ‘soon as the bid was officially accepted by the government, the legal break between 
E. Merck and Merck & Company was completed. The American company was on its 
own.’ The terms of the Trust were to ensure the ‘continuous Americanization of the 
business’ had to be followed.45 
 
At times Merck & Co still drew upon E. Merck for technological assistance, and it 
became again a distributor for the Darmstadt company’s products. But now the 
U.S. firm was increasingly able to look to domestic sources of scientific and 
technological information and expertise as it moved into new products and new 
technologies…. By [1925] this American offspring of E. Merck was financially and 
managerially autonomous, a multinational in its own right, and a business that 
would play an important role in the merger movement that would sweep 
through the American chemical industry…46 
 
This was certainly how the firm later presented its interwar experiences. In 1942 
George Perkins wrote to Foreign Funds Control Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York in order to explore whether Merck & Co. might be a possible bidder for the 
recently sequestrated U.S. subsidiary of Schering. After rehearsing the outcome of the 
1919 reacquisition of Merck & Co. by George F. Merck from the Alien Property 
Custodian, Perkins underlined the full and complete separation of Merck & Co. from E. 
Merck of Darmstadt, emphasizing that Merck & Co. had fully complied with the terms of 
the Trust. While there had been some necessary interchange between the German and 
American Mercks in the 1920s to resolve the rights to the Merck name, Perkins was 
vehement, emphasizing that there had never been any mutual ‘ownership interest,… 
influence or control, directly or indirectly’  between the two companies since 1919.47 
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In a later 2011 publication the same authors reviewed the relationship between the two 
Mercks, and offered an important nuance to their original view, that the APC-mandated 
separation was the sole critical event. In this later article the authors outlined how 
George F Merck, despite now being in control of the independent American Merck, 
actually would have preferred to have reverted to the pre-war business model. 
 
German blood was thicker than the strict rules of coporate governance… the flow 
of ideas from Darmstadt continued on an informal basis until George [F] Merck’s 
death in 1926. 
 
It was only when George F.’s son, George W. Merck, became president in 1925 that, 
 
the company appears to have adopted a new business strategy. The links to 
Germany and E. Merck appear at last to have been broken, and a thoroughly 
American corporation emerged. Through acquisition and through a new 
approach to research and development, the new president of the business 
internalised functions that had for forty years been provided by E. Merck.48  
 
In this later piece the authors suggest that the change in leadership of 1925 led to the 
decisive break with Darmstadt, as opposed to the formal transfer of ownership of 1919. 
They go on to state that George W.’s strategy was to replicate the Darmstadt business 
model in the U.S.49   
 
But the basic business strategy of getting close to advanced medical science, 
developing internal capabilities as well as elaborate external networks, and 
stressing the purity of their products and the scientific nature of the processes 
were all familiar well-tested E. Merck strategies.50 
 
This need to internalise the previously Darmstadt-based research function then 
explains the investment in new research laboratories in the early 1930s, and notably 
the Merck Institute of Therapeutic Research.51 The authors emphasize that the ability of 
George W. Merck to replicate the Darmstadt business model at Rahway was based 
around shared values, leadership and culture. 
 
German business practices, culture, and history helped lay the foundation for 
America’s climb to leadership in world pharmaceuticals after World War II and 
for Merck & Co. Inc.’s achievements in those decades52 
 
The most detailed summaries of the World War One sequestration and reacquisition of 
Merck & Co by the Merck family are therefore clear that the 1919 formal separation of 
the two companies was henceforth irrevocable, and that the continuation of ties 
between the two Merck companies was restricted to a relatively small number of 
activities. While George F. Merck may have preferred to have returned to the pre-war 
relationship, under the terms of the Trust this was impossible. His son, George W. Merck 
grasped the nettle of independence on taking formal control of Merck & Co and sought 
to replicate the Darmstadt model, internalizing the higher value activities such as 
research at Rahway that had previously only been located at Darmstadt. Other scholarly 
work on Merck & Co’s interwar evolution corroborate this view, that George W. Merck 
successfully built a fully independent American equivalent of E. Merck of Darmstadt.53 
 8 
Much of this understanding of Merck & Co’s evolution is based on research on 
correspondence between the two companies during the 1920s which was held held at 
Merck & Co’s archives. The different interpretation presented here is based on hitherto 
unused materials held at the archive of E. Merck at Darmstadt.54 This new data suggest 
that Merck’s 1919 separation from E. Merck was far from irrevocable and that George 
W. Merck’s strategy after assuming the Presidency was not to pursue total autonomy 
from Darmstadt.  
 
 
BREAKING THE TRUST.  
 
Constrained by the terms of the Trust, George F. Merck was faced with a stark choice 
after World War One. He could have continued to specialize in fine chemicals 
production, but, after the wartime boom, conditions in fine chemicals were increasingly 
difficult (see Figure 2 below). He could have copied other ethical pharmaceuticals 
companies, such as Squibb, Sterling, Sharp and Dohme and others, that were 
diversifying into consumer goods. Or he could have ignored the terms of the Trust and 
reassert the pre-war business model. It was this latter option that he chose. 
 
On September 12th, 1919, less than two months after the formal agreement of the Trust, 
and in complete contradiction of its terms, George F. Merck cabled E. Merck, saying, ‘We 
are now authorized to trade with you and will be glad to receive quotations. Our George 
W Merck will call on you next month’.55 George F. and George W. Merck were eager to 
resume ties immediately. But the German cousins, Karl and Louis Merck in Darmstadt, 
were more circumspect and more concerned with clarifying exactly what U.S. assets E. 
Merck could lay claim to. The American Mercks were trying to recreate the pre-war 
business relationship as quickly as possible. In December 1920 George W. Merck 
exclaimed, the ‘physical obstacle of the Atlantic is but a small matter when the basis of 
our understanding is so firmly established. You need never concern yourself that any 
small untoward incident will influence the true course of our relations.’56 
 
But war-time restrictions on trade were only slowly repealed. Then in 1921 and 1922 
tariffs on most pharmaceutical imports were doubled or more. This posed a significant 
threat to any resumption of the two Merck companies’ pre-war business relationship. 
After having been dominated by German imports up to 1914, the U.S. pharmaceutical 
market suddenly became supplied almost entirely by domestically produced output. 
Only 1.8 percent of U.S. consumption of pharmaceutical products was imported in the 
late 1920s.57  
 
It was only with the final settlement of the peace treaties in August 1921 that there was 
a legal structure in place in the U.S to address the outstanding legal claims from German 
citizens.58 In late 1921 Karl Merck visited Rahway to discuss Darmstadt’s loss of its 
former U.S. subsidiary. There were two issues that needed to be resolved. First, to 
review the terms and conditions of the compensation E. Merck was to receive from the 
U.S. government arising from the sequestration and then sale of the German-owned 
assets of Merck & Co. Second, to clarify the rights to the name ‘Merck’ that the newly 
independent Merck & Co might own in the U.S. and other markets. 
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The financial settlement was complicated by the opacity of cross-ownership ties 
between the Darmstadt and Rahway branches of the Merck family. While all agreed that 
Darmstadt owned 80 percent of the U.S. subsidiary and George F. Merck the balance of 
20 percent, George F. Merck had also claimed to the Alien Property Custodian that he 
had lost his 19 percent share of ownership in the Darmstadt parent without 
compensation. The U.S. authorities accepted his valuation of this stake as $1,020,108, 
and so reimbursed him from the proceeds of the $3.75 million raised from the sale of 
Darmstadt’s 80 percent stake of Merck & Co.59 It was this sum that Karl Merck wanted 
to review during late 1921. The cousins arrived at some satisfactory but unwritten 
solution, where George F. Merck voluntarily returned to Darmstadt $400,000 in 
recognition that he had been overpaid for his interest in E. Merck. From this point on 
‘extremely cordial’ relations between the two Merck’s resumed, albeit always on the 
basis of ‘informal cooperation’.60 Indeed, given the closeness of the ties between the two 
Mercks from 1921, the number of formal agreements was remarkably small. ‘Research 
information was exchanged, the executives of the two companies often visited each 
other, business information was given to each other,’ Merck & Co. resumed their pre-
war role as the U.S. distributor for E. Merck, and a market share agreement, determining 
which company was allowed to sell in which market, was strictly observed. But all this 
was based on verbal agreements. The only written agreements were a handful of 
licensing agreements.61 
 
Once the financial consequences of the sequestration had been resolved, the 
correspondence between the two companies reflected the fluctuations in the new 
business relationship. During the early 1920s, as Galambos and Sturchio state, the two 
companies had cordial, but increasingly distant relations. What will become clear, 
however, is that this fundamentally changed from the end of the 1920s onwards. 
 
 
DWINDLING AFFECTIONS: THE 1920s 
 
The first contact after the financial resolution of the two companies’ severance came 
when George W. Merck wrote to Karl Merck on January 30th, 1922. George W. reported 
that progress was being made in selling Darmstadt’s specialties, albeit deliberately 
gradual, so as to avoid the ‘danger of raising a cry of “German specialties deluging the 
market,”’ but marketing efforts were nevertheless being increased. While this was a 
welcome outcome from Karl’s visit of late 1921, it was the ‘interchange of information 
[on manufacturing processes that] is most profitable’ to Rahway.62 George W. hoped 
that some of Rahway’s processes might be of reciprocal interest to Darmstadt. But Karl 
replied that none of the manufacturing processes Rahway had suggested Darmstadt 
might want to adopt were worthwhile.63  
 
The increases in tariff barriers in 1921 and 1922 made importing increasingly cost-
ineffective. George W. wrote again in early April asking whether the former Rahway 
factory manager might come and spend some days at Darmstadt, and, through detailed 
conversations with Fritz Merck, learn how to apply the superior Darmstadt processes in 
Rahway.64 George W. was trying to persuade Darmstadt to let Rahway manufacture 
more of their specialties rather than simply distribute increasingly costly imported 
goods.  
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The Rahway factory manager was welcomed with open arms by Darmstadt and given as 
much information as needed about how to change Rahway’s processes and make them 
more profitable.65 George W. pursued this theme in July 1922, emphasizing that tariffs 
now made it prohibitively expensive to import even the newest specialty (called 
‘Eukodal’), so could Darmstadt please provide the necessary information and materials 
to support its manufacture at Rahway. He reinforced this with a request for permission 
to manufacture another product, Skiabaryt, in December 1922.66 Karl’s reply did not 
directly address this request but instead proposed a visit was needed for further 
discussion.67 But that visit did not take place. After the initial surge in enthusiasm for 
the rekindling of commercial relations between the two Mercks, Darmstadt began to 
lose interest. Two years later in November 1924, George W. Merck insisted to Louis 
Merck that it ‘would be of inordinate value to the business to have you with us again for 
a while… it has been a long time since someone from Darmstadt has been here,’ and that 
Merck & Co were eager to ‘develop the business with your products in our territory’, 
especially with specialties. Louis’ reply to George W. exposed the fragility of the 
unwritten ‘agreement’ between the cousins. For while Darmstadt was happy for a few of 
their products to be manufactured in Rahway, this was on the basis that Merck & Co 
would be an effective distributor for Darmstadt manufactured goods in the U.S. But the 
U.S. sales of Darmstadt’s products since the end of the war had proven to be very 
disappointing. Total sales of all E. Merck goods in the U.S. during 1922 to 1924 were 
only one-third their (nominal) 1913 value. The sales performance of Darmstadt 
manufactured specialties was even worse. This criticism must have stung. It exposed 
Merck & Co.’s dependence on E. Merck’s products. George W.’s response was to insist 
that the adverse impact of increased tariff barriers as well as the wartime loss of patent 
protection - ‘through no fault of ours’ - meant that the true ‘picture is a different one’. 
Darmstadt weren’t interested.68 
 
Plans for Louis’ visit to New York were cancelled. Silence reigned. In the summer of 
1925 George was reduced to rather petulantly complaining about possible sales 
territory incursions.69 In October 1925 George W. tried again, now in his position as 
President of Merck & Co, after George F.’s retirement. He implored someone to visit. 
‘Except for Karl’s visit [in 1921], which really had to do with financial matters, we have 
had no one from your House since before the War. But sooner or later, and probably 
later, there will be a revision of the tariff downward’, he added. If there was little 
prospect of any meaningful return to Rahway’s role as Darmstadt’s distributor, then 
surely Darmstadt could show Rahway how to manufacture their specialties, ‘which at 
present I see as our greatest hope. I think we could learn a great deal from you. Rudi 
Gruber is trying to arrange to get abroad early next year to spend some weeks with you, 
particularly your Specialties Department.’70 
 
There was still no response. In the immediate aftermath of resolving the postwar 
financial settlement and market-sharing agreement, Darmstadt had given 
manufacturing licenses and supplied complete information on their production to 
Merck & Co. for six specialties. In return they expected Merck & Co to promote 
Darmstadt manufactured specialties. After 1925, apart from one mutual exchange of 
information, there were no subsequent agreements before 1932.71 Given the sense of 
optimism in 1922, the stalling of any progress in returning to the pre-war business 
relationship must have been disappointing for the two George Mercks. 
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The reconstituted Merck & Co had found conditions difficult in the 1920s. Revenues 
slumped from $8.15m in 1917 to only $4.36m in 1921. Employment levels were cut by a 
third shortly after Armistice. Sales only slowly rose to $6.4m by 1926. In real terms, 
revenues had fallen by half over the decade (see Figure 2).72 As the new president, 
George W. Merck’s first major decision to arrest this decline was to acquire the larger 
specialty chemicals manufacturer, Powers Weightman Rosengarten, in 1927. According 
to Adolphe Rosengarten, Merck & Co. were ‘in trouble’. The financing of the re-
acquisition of Merck and Co. by George F. Merck in 1919 had been undertaken by 
issuing preference shares, and by 1927 Merck & Co was falling behind on its 
repayments.73 The merger enabled Merck immediately to acquire some increased 
significance in the fine chemicals market. Sales rose to $13.1m in 1928, but then fell 
again to $9.21m in 1932 and remained stagnant during the worst of the Depression. 
Costs were cut and manufacturing capacity was rationalized onto the Rahway site.74 
 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 
 
The merger meant that the newly constituted Merck & Co Inc. was the largest fine 
chemical manufacturer in the U.S. As noted above, it has been interpreted by Merck & 
Co’s historians as a statement of George W. Merck’s pursuit of an independent business 
strategy.75 One consequence of the merger with PWR was that the Trust was formally 
ended. Of course, from the outset the two George Mercks had set about to thwart 
Garvan’s intention to ensure a permanent severance of ties between Darmstadt and 
Rahway with the Trust. Ironically, however, Darmstadt’s calculation of its interests in 
the United States was leading ineluctably to Garvan’s goal because of Darmstadt’s 
commitment to a home-base-manufacture-and-export model, and Rahway’s inability to 
promote German imported products to the U.S. market sufficiently well to overcome the 
prices imposed by the tariff barriers. The merger was the clearest statement by George 
W. Merck that the strategy of recreating the pre-war relationship had failed, not because 
of the Trust, but because of Darmstadt’s unwillingness to deviate from their strategy of 
centralized manufacturing, and so their unwillingness to support Rahway’s desire to 
increase the range of products (in particular pharmaceutical specialties) it was also able 
to manufacture. Without access to Darmstadt technologies and know-how, Merck & Co 
might try and recreate the Darmstadt model at Rahway through their own efforts, but 
that was an extremely difficult business strategy to pull off. But, in what can only be 
seen as a remarkable change of fortunes, the merger precipitated a change of heart at 
Darmstadt towards Rahway.  
 
 
THE ‘TREATY AGREEMENT’, NOVEMBER 17TH 1932, AND THE ‘PROTOCOL’ NOVEMBER 
1934 
 
The merger with PWR made Merck & Co a much more significant operation, perhaps 
around half the size of E. Merck. After the merger, ‘a definite change came in E. Merck’s 
attitude to Merck & Co.’76 Within a few months George W. Merck and Fritz Rosengarten 
had visited Darmstadt. After several years of increasingly frosty relations, George W. 
was delighted. In a long letter to Karl Merck, he enthused about the renewal of 
the close relationship between our two houses [in which] lies a source of great 
strength – something from which our ever closer entente can be brought about. 
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Perhaps it is not outside the scope of probability that we may live to see the 
conditions as they should have been before the War established – perhaps even 
in more extensive form…  
 
Darmstadt insisted on their conditions being met, however. 
Of course I have kept daily before me the matters we discussed together in 
Darmstadt, and in particular various points of contact which must be 
satisfactorily conducted in order that a relationship of real mutual benefit may 
be brought about.77 
 
George W. went on to detail responses to the longstanding Darmstadt concerns that 
Merck & Co were not promoting their German manufactured chemicals and specialties 
sufficiently, and ensuring that the newly merged Merck and PWR would not encroach 
on E. Merck overseas markets.78 
 
George W. emphasized again the impact of tariffs on German imported goods, and while 
he reiterated that there might be U.S. demand for German made specialties, he returned 
to what had been a recurrent, but rebuffed, theme since 1922. 
 
Generally speaking, the best opportunities for developing manufacture over here 
are not in staple products, but in specialties – either in patented medicinal 
specialties or special articles for certain industries.79 
 
After years of Darmstadt showing little interest in changing their business to 
accommodate Rahway, the PWR merger had prompted a visit, which now changed their 
response. Correspondence grew as business relations intensified through 1929 and 
1930.80 
 
In October 1930 Karl paid an extended visit to Rahway. This was the precursor to what 
was a significant international agreement between the two Merck companies. After the 
passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in the summer of 1930, it was evident that 
tariffs were not going to be reduced. In order for E. Merck to regain their share of the 
U.S. market they would have to open a manufacturing subsidiary there. Since the 
passage of the Settlement of War Claims Act, the way was open for German firms once 
again to establish U.S. subsidiaries.81 But Darmstadt’s relationship with Rahway meant 
that increasing its U.S. market share might be more easily met through agreeing to what 
had been Rahway’s preferred strategy since 1919, of licensing the manufacturing of E. 
Merck products to them. Darmstadt had resisted any substantial development of this 
model. Their strong preference was for centralizing production of pharmaceuticals at 
Darmstadt and then exporting around the world. This was perfectly understandable 
given how important quality control was to pharmaceutical production.82 Allowing 
Rahway to manufacture under license introduced the risk of lower manufacturing 
standards. But the seeming permanence of imports being shut out of the U.S. market 
meant that the bullet of local manufacturing had to be bitten.  
 
Certainly both parties had a strong incentive to reinvigorate the relationship. But 
Darmstadt wanted it formalized. After another extended visit to Rahway, in November 
1931 Karl Merck gave Louis Merck an update on the discussions on what led to what 
became known as the ‘Treaty Agreement’. The German objective was three-fold: to get a 
 13 
formal agreement about which company could export to which overseas market; to 
have a clear idea about and accounting for the profit-sharing on the Darmstadt 
manufacturing processes that Rahway were always so eager to adopt; and to limit 
Rahway’s access to Darmstadt technology.83 It took a further year before the Treaty was 
signed. George W. Merck could only offer a ‘practical working understanding’ with 
respect to the proposed restrictions on export markets, something which was later 
seized on by U.S. anti-trust investigators.84 Karl and Louis, by contrast, insisted that 
there should be no provision for sharing scientific research.85 Disappointed at this, 
George W. had grasped at the straw that it was the informal exchange of ideas on 
manufacturing processes that was always for Rahway ‘the thing of greatest value’.86 
 
George W. Merck’s ambitions had undoubtedly grown since the merger with PWR. He 
had recruited Randolph Major, a chemist from Princeton, to improve research into 
manufacturing processes.87 Major had encouraged George W. Merck to explore the 
possibility of vitamins production.88 The scientific discovery of vitamins and their 
isolation was one of the most significant developments in pharmaceuticals in the 
interwar period. Breakthrough discoveries were no longer just emerging from German 
laboratories, with important developments coming from France, the UK and Hungary as 
well as the U.S. But developing manufacturing capabilities in any of the newly 
discovered vitamins was far from straightforward. By 1932 E. Merck had become 
pioneers of vitamins manufacturing in Germany. By 1932 it was the market leader there 
in manufacturing Vitamin A (under the brand name ‘Vogan’) and Vitamin C (‘Cebion’).89 
So for George W. Merck the Treaty represented a significant step towards the ultimate 
prize of acquiring the scientific and manufacturing capabilities in producing vitamin 
specialties. The not inconsiderable risk he faced, however, was that any kind of 
agreement on restricting competition in export markets would be judged illegal in the 
United States. At the same time George W. was planning an expansion in in-house 
research capabilities at Rahway, with the decision to open the Merck Institute of 
Therapeutic Research.90   
 
George W. took his time over the Treaty. His concerns in his correspondence with 
Darmstadt in early 1932 partly reflected the subdued state of the U.S. economy.91 But 
eventually the Treaty was signed in November 1932, ‘I am pleased that we have all 
agreed with our difficulties so that we shall soon sign the Agreement’, wrote Louis 
Merck to George W. in November 1932.92 
 
The ‘Treaty Agreement of November 17th, 1932’, summarized firstly the mutual rights to 
the Merck name in different overseas markets (Articles 1 and 2), and documents the 
pooling of technological knowledge between the two companies and the arrangement 
for profit sharing (Articles 5 and 6). There were other significant agreements between 
U.S. and overseas firms on technology sharing in the interwar period, but this was one 
of the most comprehensive. The Appendix initially contained a list of 250 products that 
were covered by the Treaty, rising to 432 products by 1939.93 While the Treaty 
undoubtedly restricted Merck & Co.’s exporting opportunities, locking both parties into 
their respective ‘spheres of influence’, it gave Rahway an unprecedented opportunity to 
benchmark its manufacturing processes.94  
 
Almost immediately after signing, Rahway staff methodically went through the list of 
processes, identifying those for which they wanted a detailed comparison with 
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Darmstadt. One of Rahway’s senior factory managers, R.P. Lukens, was dispatched to 
Darmstadt shortly after, visiting in May 1933. Lukens’, and his Darmstadt equivalent, Dr 
Kulenkamff’s, initial benchmarking exercise identified 46 of the 250 preparations where 
there were significant variations in cost or yield or method in the two factories. For 
these 46 processes the methods were exchanged and tested at both sites during June 
and July 1933.95 The detailed comparison of manufacturing processes for these 46 
chemical preparations suggested that, on balance, in 1933 Darmstadt methods 
produced a superior yield, but Rahway’s methods were relatively more efficient in their 
use of labour.96 
 
Lukens had also broached the topic of sharing early stage research findings during his 
stay. The Treaty of just a few months before had prohibited this. But Lukens reported 
that the response of the leading scientists at Darmstadt, Dr Fritz Merck, Dr Otto Dalmer 
(Head of Research) and Kulenkamff, was far more positive than that from Karl and 
Louis Merck had earlier been, and that the Darmstadt scientists’ were ‘willing to co-
operate’ in sharing research ideas.97 George W. Merck quickly followed this up with Karl 
Merck, suggesting that the two companies would ‘place the results of their research 
mutually at the disposal of the contracting parties [both Mercks] on a broad scope. 
Nothing definite was laid down about the treatment of patents and trademarks 
pertaining to the products resulting from such research.’98 By March 1934 discussions 
had moved on to agree that ‘patent data, i.e. scientific and technical features, are to be 
reported promptly to the contracting parties in connection with the regular exchange of 
research information.’99 A Draft Agreement on Patents and Trademarks was also drawn 
up in 1934. While this was never formally executed, the exchange of intellectual 
property between the two Merck companies began in earnest. It was a highly unequal 
exchange. Between 1932 and 1940 at least 38 of Merck & Co’s U.S. patents filed were 
actually E. Merck inventions. Indeed, from 1937 to 1939 18 of Merck & Co’s 34 U.S. 
patents were actually Darmstadt inventions. By contrast, Merck & Co. applied for zero 
patents in Germany before 1939.100  
 
In the meantime George W. Merck had invested in a major new research building at 
Rahway and appointed Dr Hans Molitor (a pharmacologist from Vienna University) to 
direct the Merck Institute of Therapeutic Research which opened in June 1933 to herald 
the advent of basic physiological research within the industry.101 Molitor’s role at Merck 
& Co was crucial in establishing its scientific and research capabilities. Max Tishler, who 
went on to be head of research at Merck & Co, insisted that Molitor and his leading of 
the Merck Institute’s research programme in vitamins was of critical importance. It was 
Molitor along with Major and George W. Merck that decided the overall research 
programme.102  
 
Molitor’s initial research programme between 1934 and 1936 was focused on: 
anaesthetics, alkaloids, hypnotics, antispasmotics, vagomimetic and sympathomimetic 
drugs, vitamins (as food supplements), notably vitamin C. Later, from 1936, Vitamin B1 
became increasingly important, so that by 1939 vitamin research overall accounted for 
half of all Merck Institute time.103 This initial research programme at the Institute did 
not emerge from a vacuum. But nor did it emerge from any pre-existing commitment to 
any particular research pathway within the firm. There were few pharmaceutical 
research commitments at Rahway of any significance facing Molitor when the Merck 
Institute opened in 1933. The company’s commitment to research was modest until 
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then, research expenditures were only 1.5 percent of sales in 1932. The current 
literature views the opening of the Institute as the catalyst for the development of 
independent research capabilities within Merck & Co.104 But Max Tishler later recalled 
that during his first few months after joining the company in 1937, he was aware that 
little actual research was done in the company. It was only by 1938 that the Merck 
Institute began conducting some ‘fundamental as well as applied research’.105 There 
was very little basic research conducted internally at Merck & Co before then.106 Merck 
& Co’s scientists hardly published in scientific journals at all in the early 1930s. 
Evidence of Merck & Co’s commitment to scientific publication in pharmaceuticals 
journals can only be seen from as late as 1938.107 Adolphe Rosengarten later made the 
point that all Merck & Co’s new products before the war had came from outside 
consultants, not from Merck & Co’s own scientists.108  
 
If the Merck Institute was not therefore the catalyst for the creation of research 
capabilities at Merck & Co until the very end of the 1930s, what did it do before then? A 
clue is found in Molitor’s initial research programme at the Institute. This very closely 
maps onto the specialty areas selected for inclusion in the extension to the 1932 Treaty 
Agreement, agreed at two conferences in October and November 1934. This, the 
‘Protocol of Conferences between Rahway and Darmstadt with Regard to Researches 
and New Products’, of November 1934, incorporated 35 new specialties into the 
Treaty.109  
 
This ‘Protocol’ document bears close reading. It was the documentary outcome of the 
process begun by Lukens in the summer of 1933 in broaching the topic of sharing 
research, a feature which had been deliberately omitted from the 1932 Treaty at 
Darmstadt’s insistence. If the technological competences of both contracting parties 
were approximately the same, then both stood to gain more or less equally from the 
Research Protocol. But Darmstadt were acutely aware that while Merck & Co and E 
Merck enjoyed approximate parity in chemicals manufacturing expertise by the early 
1930s, Darmstadt’s expertise in research and specialties was far ahead of Rahway’s. 
This is apparent from the list of ‘researches and new products’ covered in the Protocol. 
Out of thirty-five listed, only six were listed as Rahway developments, one of which, 
Vitamin B1, was included but, having only just been offered to Rahway by an external 
inventor, was too early to make judgments about. Of the 29 preparations emerging from 
Darmstadt, the products and technologies were focused on anaesthetics, improved 
alkaloids, hypnotics, antispasmotics, vagomimetic and sympathomimetic drugs, and of 
course vitamins, notably vitamin C research, exactly the same areas as those prioritised 
by Molitor in the Merck Institute’s initial research programme.110  
 
Molitor had spent considerable time at Darmstadt on his appointment to the Merck 
Institute. Within weeks of his arrival at Rahway, George W. Merck was sending him back 
to Europe for an extended visit to Darmstadt. George W. wrote to Karl Merck at the end 
of October, that ‘I was very glad that you counted the visit of Dr Molitor as beneficial to 
you; we certainly feel that it was on this side… to further the co-operation between our 
Companies.’111 Given the range of potential subject areas Molitor, Major and Merck 
might have chosen to prioritise in 1933, the overlap between exactly those areas 
prioritized by Molitor and the Merck Institute between 1934 and 1936 and the 
specialties offered by Darmstadt for the November 1934 extension to the 1932 Treaty, 
must lead to the very strong inference that Merck & Co.’s research programme emerged 
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from Molitor’s extensive visits to Darmstadt. Molitor undoubtedly sanctioned other, 
non-Protocol related research in the Institute.112 But the selection of the Institute’s 
research in the specialties made available to Rahway by Darmstadt was surely not a 
coincidence.  
 
Unsurprisingly the number of visits between Rahway and Darmstadt increased after the 
1934 Protocol and their character changed. Instead of the visitors being the most senior 
managers, from 1934 onwards the visitors were increasingly the senior scientists on 
both sides. From Merck & Co it was increasingly Gruber and Molitor who visited 
Darmstadt and who hosted Dalmer and the other senior scientists from E. Merck.113 The 
first result was that Rahway’s manufacturing capabilities in several respects caught up 
with those of Darmstadt between 1933 and 1938. Rahway’s improvement in research 
capabilities followed.  
 
The evidence of Rahway’s improvement in manufacturing capabilities can be traced 
through specific product discussion between the two sites, and then successive 
benchmarking exercises. First, a February 1935 invitation to discuss Merck & Co’s lactic 
acid processes, led to an invitation for Darmstadt to ‘explore the manufacture of Citric 
Acid by fermentation process from the point of view of any interest it may hold for E. 
Merck.’ Recall that Vitamin C production was where Darmstadt was one of the world 
leaders. After benchmarking, Rahway’s production processes were deemed to be 
superior, and this led in November 1936 to a separate agreement for ascorbic acid (bulk 
sales).114  
 
During September 1937 there was a further revision to the range of products included 
in the Treaty. Out of the original 250, several were no longer being manufactured, but 
more significantly each firm had added to its total number of products. The revised list 
was titled, ‘Processes operated by Merck & Co., Inc. and E. Merck Darmstadt’. Just over 
100 of the chemical processes listed were benchmarked in Darmstadt using both 
companies’ techniques, following Lukens’ original benchmarking methodology of 1933. 
The results suggest that while both companies were now approximately evenly divided 
in the relative cost advantages across the range of processes, Merck & Co were now 
consistently outperforming Darmstadt in the yield attainment across the products 
tested.115 This in turn led to Merck & Co sending to Darmstadt a list of 34 of Rahway’s 
improved processes for articles included in the Treaty, and a further 12 processes for 
non-treaty articles, including for the first time Merck & Co’s sulfanilamide process. 
 
In return Merck & Co. requested 32 processes (mostly for the same products) to be sent 
from Darmstadt to Rahway for comparison, including Darmstadt’s process for 
sulfanilamide. Lukens letter of December 6th, 1937 to Darmstadt lists the 29 German 
processes received, including Darmstadt’s process for aminobenzene sulfonamide. By 
1938 Rahway’s increasing capabilities at manufacturing even the newer specialties had 
become clear. In the subsequent revision to the Treaty, dated 10th June 1938, the new 
additions included three very significant new specialties: ‘Ascorbic Acid (Vitamin C) and 
Tablets’, ‘Sulfanilamide (p-aminobenzene-Sulfonamide)’, and ‘Vitamin B1 (crystal, 
synthetic, natural and tablet)’.116  
 
The inclusion of Vitamin B1 in the summer of 1938 is particularly significant because 
Vitamin B1 was Merck & Co’s own breakthrough product. Its arrival at Rahway, as the 
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November 1934 Research Protocol had alluded to, was nothing to do with Merck & Co’s 
research programme. Molitor’s vitamin research in 1933 and 1934, as already noted, 
was focused on Darmstadt’s vitamin C processes. Instead Robert Williams, an 
independent researcher, employed by Bell Labs but with links to Columbia University, 
wanted to test his idea that vitamin B occurred naturally in rice husks. For this he 
required industrial scale rice polishing and testing facilities, hence his approach to 
Merck & Co. Early results were sufficiently promising to lead to its inclusion as one of 
Rahway’s few specialties in the Research Protocol list. It took another two years before 
the critical breakthrough of synthesizing Vitamin B1 was accomplished. But this was 
done by Merck & Co’s researchers, notably J.K. Cline. Then ‘the door was opened for its 
economical and large scale production’.117 With some further months of development 
research required to establish a pilot and then a manufacturing plant, Merck launched 
vitamin B1 into the U.S. market at the end of 1937 and by 1940 it was generating 
significant revenues. In December 1941 the company highlighted the significance of 
Vitamin B1 sales in its prospectus to potential investors for a new stock offering.118 At 
this point Merck & Co were happy to advertise that since 1936 its research had led to a 
host of new products, ranging from Vitamin B2, B6, C, E, G and K, as well as 
sulfonamides, but pride of place went to the increase in sales from Vitamin B1. 
 
Vitamin B1 also changed the nature of the relationship with Darmstadt. As has been 
emphasized above, from the resumption of commercial relations in late 1921 through to 
the late-1930s, Rahway was unambiguously the junior partner. It had largely depended 
on Darmstadt technology, and it was only from 1928 at the very earliest that Darmstadt 
saw it was in their interests to allow Rahway increasing access to first manufacturing 
processes and then, from 1934, to its research and new specialties. Molitor seemingly 
focused the Merck Institute research programme exactly on those areas of new research 
that Darmstadt were willing to include in the November 1934 Research Protocol. The 
exchange of information on manufacturing processes contributed to improvements in 
manufacturing productivity on both sides, but notably led to Merck & Co.’s 
improvement in yield seen by the end of 1937. Merck & Co.’s manufacturing capabilities 
in chemical production were now, according to the benchmark data, consistently equal 
to and in many areas ahead of Darmstadt. Its research capabilities were also rapidly 
catching up.  
 
The synthesis of vitamin B1 in 1936 and 1937 was the critical breakthrough that 
demonstrated to Darmstadt that Rahway had acquired some considerable scientific 
competence. While it did not initially lead to much interest from Darmstadt, the obvious 
commercial significance was such that Darmstadt went to some considerable lengths to 
acquire the European manufacturing rights.119 The agreement was finally signed in 
October 1939. Before then, during 1938 Darmstadt and Rahway decided to recognize 
the mutual contribution by each company to the other’s vitamin business by 
terminating any future separate accounting for either Darmstadt’s vitamin B1 sales or 
Merck & Co.’s vitamin C sales. ‘In the future E. Merck and Merck & Co. will exchange 
manufacturing information on Vitamin B1 and Vitamin C without compensation’.120 This 
then was surely the point when George W. Merck’s strategy of replicating German 
manufacturing standards and internalising independent research capabilities at 
Rahway reached fruition. This was evidence of a near parity in the relationship between 
the two Mercks at last. 
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But such intimate relations had a cost once the U.S. entered World War Two. The newly 
reformed Alien Property Custodian received an anonymous complaint that German 
spies were operating at Rahway in February 1942.121 This triggered a series of official 
investigations, first by the FBI, before the Alien Property Custodian once again became 
involved with Merck & Co during the summer of 1942. It was at the beginning of these 
investigations that Perkin wrote his March 1942 memo to Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York setting out Merck & Co’s case that there had been since 1919 no ‘interest…, control 
or influence’ by E. Merck over Merck & Co. The 1932 Treaty and its impact on Merck & 
Co was described as ‘relatively inconsequential’. The provisions in the Treaty on the 
mutual exchange of information were ‘nothing more than the reduction to writing of 
common practice… simply a means by which each party endeavored to get the benefit of 
the other’s manufacturing experience… nothing unusual in the arrangement to procure 
new production’ from Darmstadt.122 The letter was carefully written, for while almost 
everything in it was credible, it deliberately downplayed the significance of the 
relationship with Darmstadt. It is noteworthy that none of the investigating agents of 
the APC or anti-trust investigation, or OMGGUS believed this version of events. All were 
convinced that the relationship between the two Merck companies was an unofficial 
and informal partnership, the extent of which had been deliberately obscured from the 
authorities in order to protect the private interests of the two companies.123 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
George F. Merck reacquired control of Merck & Co in 1919. The terms of the APC-
mandated Trust were to ensure that Merck & Co would be permanently severed from its 
former parent, E. Merck. The current literature suggests that Merck & Co very largely 
complied with the terms of the Trust, that exchanges between the two Mercks, once the 
outstanding wartime financial issues were resolved, were limited to personal 
correspondence, some technical assistance and the correspondence to support the sale 
of a few Darmstadt manufactured products in the U.S. Previous studies have suggested 
that Merck & Co. was entirely independent of any influence of its former German parent 
by sometime in mid-1920s.124 ‘While some transfers of knowledge were probably 
recreated in the 1920s, the aftermath of the war was an increasingly independent 
American firm, Merck & Co. Inc.’125 George F. Merck may have wanted to return to the 
pre-war business model. But the current view is of Merck & Co’s interwar evolution is 
that George W. Merck on assuming the presidency was set on a course of autonomy and 
independence. George W. Merck is remembered as a business leader unusual for being 
so farsighted, so focused on science and research, and not on profits. He is generally 
seen as being central to Merck & Co.’s acquisition of independent research capabilities 
before 1940.126  
 
But this interpretation underestimates Merck & Co’s continuing dependence on the 
larger E. Merck for access to the most advanced products in the interwar period. From 
the moment George F. Merck reacquired control of Merck & Co. considerable efforts 
were made to re-engage with its former parent and re-establish the pre-war business 
relationship, regardless of the existence of the Trust. Nevertheless, the attempts to re-
establish the pre-war business relationship were dashed between the Scylla of high U.S. 
tariffs and the Charybdis of Darmstadt’s commitment to retaining central control of 
almost all manufacturing. As the two companies drifted apart, Merck & Co’s fortunes 
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stagnated, forcing a merger with the larger Powers Weightman Rosengarten in 1927. 
This merger, almost paradoxically after years of stalemate, proved to be the catalyst 
which recreated the relationship between the two Mercks, leading to first several visits 
and exchanges of information, then to the 1932 Treaty, and the 1934 Protocol, and 
ultimately to the very significant transfer of technology from E. Merck to Merck & Co.  
 
The 1932 Treaty and its subsequent 1934 extension to include research and specialties 
(the Research Protocol) were therefore key events in the formation of Merck & Co’s 
independent research and advanced manufacturing capabilities. The treaty precipitated 
Lukens’ successive benchmarking exercise from 1933 onwards, which, as the later 
benchmarking exercises confirm, show that Rahway’s manufacturing capabilities were 
catching up with, and in several areas actually exceeded, those at Darmstadt by 1938. It 
is against the  context of the Treaty and the Research Protocol that the recruitment of 
Major and Molitor, the establishment of the Merck Institute of Therapeutic Research 
and the Central Research Laboratories, and the bridges built with university scientists 
in the U.S. should be judged. From the November 1934 Research Protocol onwards, 
Merck & Co.’s scientists gained privileged access to superior process and product 
technologies, enabling Rahway scientists to acquire insight and understanding of 
advanced research knowledge, routines and knowhow without having to do all the 
experimental work themselves.  
 
The German influence at Merck & Co was therefore more profound and much longer 
lasting than has hitherto been thought. While Merck & Co. were expanding their internal 
research capabilities from 1933 onwards, the evidence on research expenditure, 
publications and patents presented here suggests that Merck & Co’s Rahway-based 
scientists were indeed beginning to move from focusing on developmental research to 
more fundamental pharmaceuticals research in the 1930s. But not only in the late 
1930s, perhaps as late as 1937 and 1938. Judging from the patent data, where even as 
late as 1937 to 1939 over half of all Merck & Co’s U.S. patents were actually Darmstadt 
inventions, Merck & Co’s scientific and research capabilities still lagged behind those of 
E. Merck.  
 
By contrast, the case of Merck & Co suggests that where U.S. pharmaceuticals producers 
may have caught up and even overtaken German producers was in process 
technologies. Merck & Co. was generating both additional yield and with greater labour 
efficiencies than E. Merck across most benchmarked processes by 1937 and 1938. 
Merck & Co was one of the leading pharmaceutical companies in the U.S. war effort and 
went on to become one of the globally dominant producers after 1945. The current view 
in the business history literature is that it acquired sufficiently sophisticated research 
and manufacturing capabilities by 1940 entirely through the decisions made by its 
senior management, notably George W. Merck, in creating its own internal research 
capacity. This view is not wrong. It is just incomplete. It is a view that is based on a 
detailed reconstruction of the company’s relationship with its former parent in the 
1920s, and the research presented here confirms that this relationship grew 
increasingly distant. But scholars have previously omitted continuing this research for 
the 1930s. Here, by contrast, and benefitting from access to previously unpublished 
sources from the extensive Darmstadt archive, we have been able to present a 
substantially more detailed account of the two companies’ interwar relationship, and in 
particular to show how the merger with PWR led directly to a dramatic change and to 
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much closer co operation. This growing closeness was embodied in the 1932 Treaty and 
the 1934 Research Protocol (and its subsequent revisions). When these documents are 
analysed in detail, it is clear that Rahway’s research capabilities were far behind those 
of Darmstadt in the early 1930s. The imbalance of the 1934 Protocol demonstrates that. 
By 1938, however, after George W. Merck’s substantial increase in research 
expenditures, after the establishment and growth of Molitor’s Merck Institute, and also 
after recognising the sharing of knowledge between Rahway and Darmstadt, Rahway’s 
research capabilities had improved significantly and they were justified in being 
considered among the leaders in the U.S. industry. The successful synthesis of Vitamin 
B1 and then its commercially successful launch was undoubtedly a breakthrough 
episode for Rahway. 
 
The case of Merck & Co therefore needs to be understood in the light it being the 
beneficiary of this substantial and previously ignored technology transfer from its 
former German parent. George W. Merck was indeed making every effort to replicate 
the Darmstadt model at Rahway, as scholars have previously noted.127 But his success in 
achieving these objectives was seemingly dependent on the transfer of technology and 
process know-how from Darmstadt. Because of Merck’s position of leadership within 
the U.S. industry, this is a significant caveat to this important case. The conventional 
understanding is that the U.S. government’s intervention during and after world war 
one allowed American firms to ‘accumulate a pool of technical expertise through 
education and experience’.128 The caveat would be that for one of the most important 
American pharmaceutical firms, Merck & Co, this accumulation of technical expertise 
was enormously augmented by support from its former German parent, E. Merck of 
Darmstadt.  
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Table 1. Total US Patents – 1932-1939. Abbott Laboratories, Parke Davis, Eli Lilly and 
Merck & Co. 
 
 Abbott Parke Davis Lilly Merck 
1932 4 1 4 0 
1933 5 1 2 1 
1934 6 3 4 1 
1935 3 4 9 3 
1936 2 2 3 6 
1937 9 10 5 6 
1938 5 6 8 11 
1939 3 8 9 17 
Total 37 35 44 45 
  
 
Source: Google Patents. Total of all US patents by year of publication from 01.01.1932 to 
12.31.1939 by selected assignee firms (minus patents for equipment). Firms selected 
were the four largest U.S. firms (by capital employed in 1950 – see note 5 for source) 
that had been producing pharmaceuticals in the 1930s. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Employment at E. Merck Darmstadt and Merck & Co. 
 
 E. Merck Merck & Co. 
1895  180 
1904 1200  
1914 2100 <800 
1923 3600  
1925-30 3000  
1938/9 4100 1800 
1940  2200 
1941  3000 
 
Notes and sources: Merck & Co. 1914 inferred from Rosengarten interview p. 5 that 
PWR after WW1 employed 800, and that Merck & Co., was both smaller than PWR and 
smaller in 1914 than after WW1. E. Merck employment data sources listed in note 35. 
Merck & Co., in Sturchio and Galambos, Values and Visions, Appendix. 
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of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index. 
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